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Abstract
While much empirical research has been done on the labour market consequences
of unemployment benefits, there is remarkably little evidence on the forces
determining benefits. The paper presents a simple model where workers desire
insurance against the possibility of unemployment and unemployment benefits
increase the unemployment rate. We then conduct, what we believe, is one of the
first empirical analyses of the determinants of the parameters of the unemployment
benefit system. Using OECD data for 1971-1989, controlling for year and country
fixed effects, and controlling for the political colour of the government, we find
evidence suggesting that benefits fall when the unemployment rate is high. This is
consistent with the tax-effect described in Wright (1986) and Atkinson (1990).
There is weaker evidence that benefits increase with positive changes in the
unemployment rate, which may be proxying for the inflow rate and could be called
an insurance effect.
JEL Classification: H53, J65.
Keywords: endogenous unemployment benefits, unemployment, politics.
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I. Introduction
   Countries differ in the generosity of their unemployment benefit programs. Within each
country the unemployment benefit programs change over time. Why? What are the
causes of these differences? This paper provides an attempt at evaluating how much of
these variations can be explained by economic and political factors. In other words, we
attempt to study the determinants of unemployment benefits.
   Although considerable attention has been paid to the growth of the welfare state
measured by total welfare spending (e.g. Ram [1987], Roubini and Sachs [1989], inter
alia) there appears to be no previous published empirical work on the determinants of an
unemployed worker's benefit allowance. Most of the existing empirical papers related to
unemployment benefits concentrates on the effects of benefits in unemployment
regressions (e.g. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca [1976], Feldstein [1978], inter alia). This, and
other related work, has been interpreted by some economists as indicating that an over
generous welfare state is behind the poor economic performance of certain European
countries. They favour benefit cuts as a cure for the unemployment problem. Yet a policy
of cutting unemployment benefits to help the unemployed sounds paradoxical. It seems
that before taking any macroeconomic policy actions we should conduct a more careful
inquiry into the determinants of unemployment benefits.
   This paper presents a simple model where workers desire insurance against
unemployment, but where higher benefits require higher taxes (budget constraint) and
bring about higher unemployment (incentive constraint). Using OECD data for 1971-89,
we show how economic and political variables affect the parameters of the
unemployment benefit system
   To our knowledge, only two theory papers have looked before at the positive aspects of
the determination of unemployment benefits.
1 In Wright [1986] the level of
                                                       
     
1 Following Feldstein's criticism of the incentive effects of benefits there have been
considerable efforts on the normative side (see Baily [1978], Flemming [1978], Shavell and
Weiss [1979], inter alia).  Kiander [1993] derives the optimal unemployment benefit policy for a
trade union when search matters, and shows that it is a decreasing function of the trade union’s
share of the costs of the insurance fund.3
unemployment insurance is set by the employed majority. He predicts that a higher
discount rate lowers the optimal level of benefits for the employed median voter. Both
Wright [1986] and Atkinson [1990] show that the response of the employed majority to a
higher unemployment rate may be to make the system less generous. Neither paper,
however, takes into account the incentive effects of benefits (i.e. neither allows for a
positive impact of unemployment benefits on the unemployment rate), an important
feature of our model. A relevant paper presenting a normative analysis is Boadway and
Oswald [1982]. They show how a government that has redistributive objectives may
optimally intervene in the economy by providing unemployment benefits. Thus, the
empirical prediction is that left-wing preferences of society, which presumably are
correlated with a desire for income redistribution, will have a positive effect on benefits.
   Our paper is related to the recent work of Rodrik [1998] (see also Cameron [1978]). He
finds a positive correlation between a country's level of openness and the amount of
government consumption. He explains it as follows: "More open economies have greater
exposure to the risks emanating from turbulence in world markets. One can view larger
government spending in such economies as performing an insulation function, insofar as
the government sector is the "safe" sector (in terms of employment and purchases from
the rest of the economy) relative to other activities..." (pg. 1011). He considers the
objection that the government's risk reducing role would best be served by establishing a
safety net, "in which case it would show up mainly in government spending on social
security and welfare, and not in government consumption". He shows evidence consistent
with this view for "advanced countries, which do have the administrative capacity to
manage social welfare systems" (pg. 1012). The evidence comes in the form of
regressions of social security and welfare expenditures as percentage of GDP on
openness and external risk (terms of trade instability). Two aspects of the link between
risk and insurance remain to be established, however. First, from a theory point of view,
it would be important to have more evidence on the channel through which the link
operates. In other words, we would like to be sure that the measure of external risk of the
country affects variables that capture the type of personal risks that people care about4
(e.g. like falling unemployed). And also that the government's reaction involves a
program that is related to that risk (e.g. like unemployment benefits). Second, and
perhaps more importantly, the measure of social insurance Rodrik [1998] uses (social
security and welfare spending over GDP) depends directly on the number of claimants
which, in turn, may be affected by risk. That is, for a number of categories of social
spending, the left-hand variable may not be independently defined from the right-hand
variable.
2 Our paper comes closer to avoiding these problems by looking directly at the
link between unemployment and the parameters of the unemployment insurance
programs. Thus, we see our paper as complementing Rodrik's approach.
   A potentially important application of the present paper has been pointed out by
Blanchard and Katz [1997]. They suggest that the evidence presented here could be used
to evaluate the relative importance of the channels through which hysteresis operates. If
countries that experience shocks to the unemployment rate increase their level of
unemployment benefits (depending on the political party that is in power), and if this
increases the unemployment rate further, we may then have an explanation for why some
countries' unemployment rates remain high for such prolonged periods of time. Some of
the work of Saint-Paul on labour market flexibility is also relevant to the problems we
discuss. A recent review paper (Saint-Paul [1996]) also looks at the determinants of
unemployment benefits using a different specification and compares his results with
those obtained in an earlier version of this paper.
3
   Section II outlines the model while Section III explains our empirical strategy and
describes the data. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V proposes three
pieces of evidence that can be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that
                                                       
     
2 An example clarifies this. Suppose a country experiences an exogenous shock that increases
the unemployment rate. If an unemployment insurance program is in place, that year social
security and welfare payments as a percentage of GDP will rise automatically because there are
more claimants to the system. Furthermore, even if total payments have increased, the amount of
insurance that people actually get will have fallen. The reason is that the cost of risk (the cost of
falling unemployed) goes up with unemployment because expected duration increases.
     
3 For example, he includes a different set of controls and uses a different sample. The working
paper version of this paper is Di Tella and MacCulloch [1995].5
unemployment benefits increase with positive changes in the unemployment rate. This
section also provides direct evidence on the line of causality argued in the paper by
examining the legal environment which defines benefit provision and a short case study
based on historical evidence on the birth of the American welfare state. Section VI
concludes.
II.  A Simple Model
   In this section we sketch a simple model to provide a motivation for the empirical
section. Unemployment benefits are determined by the government, constrained by its
financial possibilities and by labour market conditions, which we assume involve
equilibrium unemployment.
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such that
ub s = Budget Constraint (2)
) , ( W = b u m Labour Market Equilibrium (3)
where V
E and V
U are the lifetime expected utilities of an employed and an unemployed
worker respectively, V
F is the value of firms (if we assume workers and owners of firms
are distinct individuals), y and f are the welfare weights given by the government to the
unemployed versus the employed, and between workers and firms, respectively (where
0£f£1 and 0£y£1) and u is the unemployment rate.  Equation (2) is the budget
constraint. It assumes that every employed and unemployed worker pays a tax, s, out of
their gross income to support the welfare state. Equation (3) is the labour market
equilibrium in which firms maximise profits at the point where their labour demand is
equated to a "wage curve", so that the function m(b,W) describes how benefits are related
to unemployment and W is a vector of parameters (including the price of inputs, inflow6
rate, etc.). The function m(.) could represent a variety of models of wage formation, such
as efficiency wages or union bargaining models, where there is involuntary
unemployment.
   We focus on the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game where the government is able to
commit to a level of benefits (e.g. through legislation) and firms subsequently set wages
and employment to maximize profits. The (subgame) perfect Nash equilibrium of the
Stackelberg game in which the government moves first is characterised by:
4
) , ( S = u b b (4)
where S is a vector of parameters including the welfare weights, the rate of time
preference and labour market conditions, including the inflow rate into unemployment
and the expected duration of unemployment and other factors that affect the utility of the
employed and the unemployed such as their different social status.
5 In general (provided
firms' profits are a negative function of benefits), we find that as the welfare weighting of
firms versus workers rises the government's choice of benefits will be lower.
Comparative static results for other variables depend on the unemployment/benefit trade-
off (these are shown in Appendix I).
   To see the intuition behind those results, first assume that benefits do not affect
unemployment. As long as the weight y<u, we do not have full insurance. The effect of a
higher level of unemployment (due to an exogenous shock) on the level of benefits is
ambiguous. On the one hand, higher unemployment means a higher tax burden for the
                                                       
     
4 Note the element of dynamic inconsistency: the government must be able to commit to the
Stackelberg benefit level since, given the unemployment rate, it has a profitable deviation. Such
extensions are important when dealing with practical issues on policy reforms, although are
outside the scope of this paper. Results for the Nash equilibrium are available in our working
paper.
     
5 An interesting feature of the model is that we can define political ideology using economics:
A left wing political party is one that values more an extra util (in the social welfare function)
achieved through extra insurance than an extra util achieved through lower taxes. The opposite is
true for a right wing party.7
employed (so benefits would fall, as in Atkinson [1990]), but it also means that they
should expect spells of longer duration if they were to fall unemployed (so they would
like to see higher benefits). The appendix shows conditions under which the first effect
dominates. A higher discount rate leads to lower benefits because the employed don’t
want to pay taxes now for benefits they will receive in the future, an effect already
present in Wright [1986]. To the extent that a higher discount rate would increase the
level of unemployment (as in some efficiency wage models), we would expect to find a
negative tax effect that would reinforce the Wright effect, and a positive effect through
longer expected duration (as the employed want better insurance).
6 Higher inflows, on the
other hand, lead to higher benefits as the employed want more insurance. To the extent
that inflows increase the unemployment rate, we would again expect to find a negative
effect on benefits (because of the higher tax burden) and a positive effect because of the
longer expected durations when the unemployment rate is higher.
   The case when benefits increase unemployment is more complicated. A general point is
that the unemployment costs of benefits mean there is not full insurance, even if y=u.
Thus, now falling unemployed is more costly and any factor that increases the duration of
unemployment has a more positive effect on benefits. Furthermore, reducing benefits has
the advantage that, ceteris paribus, it reduces unemployment (hence taxes) and the
expected duration of unemployment spells (for details see Appendix I).
III.  Empirical Strategy and Data
The following linear form of equation (4) in Section II is estimated:
Benefits iT = a Unemployment iT + b Inflows iT + g Right Wing iT +
d Time Preference iT + h i + w T + e iT (5)
                                                       
     
6 In a model where saving is allowed, a higher rate of interest (maybe because monetary policy
is tight) may make individuals less willing to vote for a generous welfare state. This would
happen if the return from investing the tax contributions becomes larger than the expected benefit
from having benefits if one falls unemployed.8
We control for both country (hi) and time (wT) fixed effects so the basic estimator is
Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV). Our dependent variable (Benefits) is calculated
as the pre-tax average of the unemployment benefit replacement ratios for two earnings
levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment (see Appendix II for
the exact variable definitions). As an index, this summary measure is not necessarily
close to the initial replacement ratio people are entitled to after losing a job, or to the
average level of benefit currently received by unemployed people. It is not weighted, for
example, by the composition of unemployment in each country and year. Importantly,
since it covers a variety of typical cases (e.g. single, married with/without a dependent
spouse) it is not prone to the weakness of other benefit data that do not reflect a common
practice whereby cuts in one type of benefit are simply offset by a corresponding increase
in another type.
7 Although our data still have a number of weaknesses (for example, there
is no allowance for the fact that, in some countries, governments support the unemployed
through subsidies linked to their previous employers rather than through benefits), we
believe it represents a significant improvement over previously available benefit data.
   One potential problem with the data is that they mix insurance payments with social
assistance. The latter is typically not linked to previous employment and contributions to
an insurance fund. In other words the logic of such payments may have more to do with
reducing inequality than with providing insurance. We obtained the raw OECD data and
constructed the average benefits paid out in the first year in unemployment and called it
Benefits Short. We also calculated the average level of benefits for people who have been
unemployed for more than three years. This variable is called Benefits Long and is
presumably driven by a different economic logic than first year unemployment insurance.
In fact the raw correlation coefficient between the two measures of benefit generosity is
14 percent. In the appendix we graph these three measures for five selected countries
(US, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany and Ireland). Benefits Short and Benefits Long
                                                       
     
7  The OECD produced the data in 1994. They are available every two years, so we use two
year averages for all the other variables used, and a period in equation (5) equals two years.
Interpolating the benefit data would allow us to run regressions with 320 observations, although it
may give the impression that we have more information than we actually do.9
appear to behave very differently. The appendix also provides a brief description of the
unemployment benefit programs in place in each country in a typical year. It shows that
the primary component during most of the first year is an unemployment insurance
system (the exceptions are Australia and New Zealand). The duration of this program
varies across countries. It also shows that when one gets past the third year, the main
component of unemployment compensation is unemployment and social assistance
(notable exceptions are Belgium and France). Assistance refers to means-tested income
support whereby the government acts to secure a minimum standard of living. See
Appendix II.
   The variable Right Wing, a measure of how far the political preferences of the
government lean towards the right, proxies for both the relative power of firms over
workers 1-f, and of employed workers over the unemployed 1-y. The variable Right
Wing is similar to those employed by political scientists to indicate the left/right position
of a government, and is constructed in two steps. In the first step, we collect the number
of votes received by each party participating in cabinet and express them as a percentage
of the total votes received by all parties with cabinet representation. This percentage of
support is then multiplied in the second step by a left/right political scale (from Castles
and Mair [1984]) and summed across all the cabinet parties to give a continuous variable.
Workers' discount rate is proxied by the long run real interest rate paid by the government
on long term bonds (Interest Rate), obtained from the OECD Historical Statistics. Budget
constraint effects are captured by including the unemployment rate (Unemployment). An
important limitation for our empirical efforts is the lack of suitable inflow data. Some
regression specifications we will use can be reinterpreted so that the change in the
unemployment rate (DUnemployment) acts as a proxy for the inflow rate. Appendix II
(Tables A.I. and A.II.) presents the raw data and all data definitions.
IV. The Empirical Evidence
   Regression (1) in Table I estimates a basic version of equation (5). It reveals a
significant negative coefficient on the unemployment rate consistent with budget10
constraint effects as described in the model in section II and earlier in Wright [1986] and
Atkinson [1990]. The size of the coefficient predicts that an increase of 3.4 percentage
points (one standard deviation) in the level of unemployment, ceteris paribus, reduces
benefits by 1.9 percentage points or 14 percent of a standard deviation in benefits (-
0.547*0.034/0.129). The coefficient on the real interest rate is positive, though the effect
is only significant at the 10-percent level. Although multicollinearity is a potential source
of concern, we note that this result stands in contrast to the predictions of models with no
incentive effects of benefits – such as Wright [1986] and case I in Appendix I – and is
what we expect in a model where higher benefits increase the unemployment rate – such
as case II in Appendix I. Regression (1) reveals no significant effects of the political
inclination of the government (Right Wing) on unemployment benefits (although the
coefficient is negative, consistent with Boadway and Oswald [1982]).
8 Thus, controlling
for economics, the basic evidence shows no effects of politics on benefit determination,
which is perhaps surprising.
   Regression (2) allows for a lag in the determination of unemployment benefits.
Although our model does not consider such dynamics explicitly, it may be reasonable to
expect some delay until political and economic changes affect unemployment benefits. A
possible motivation is that legislators need to take notice of such changes or, in extreme
cases, need to be replaced by individuals more sensitive to the new demands.
9 The results
suggest this is largely the case. The coefficient on the unemployment rate is 52 percent
larger in absolute value (i.e. more negative) than that in regression (1), while the standard
error is of similar size. It is also economically significant. A one standard deviation
increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a decrease in benefits of 2.8
percentage points one period later. This equals 22 percent of a standard deviation in
                                                       
     
8 The regression results look almost identical if Right Wing is excluded, and if estimation is by
GLS random effects (Balestra-Nerlove), instead of LSDV. This section reports a number of
results not included in the tables that are available upon request.
     
9 In other words, we assume there is indirect democracy. Note that, because the data are
available only for every two years, and a lag in these variables involve data from previous
periods, we estimate effects of up to four years (i.e. within one legislative period). The average
election in our sample occurs every four years.11
benefits. There is still evidence of a positive effect of the interest rate, this time
significant at the 5 percent level. The political inclination of the government is significant
at the 10 percent level. A change in government equivalent to substituting Francois
Mitterrand by Margaret Thatcher (equal to 3.5 standard deviations in the variable, Right
Wing) is expected to bring about a reduction in unemployment benefits of 2.5 percentage
points (or 20 per cent of a standard deviation in the benefits variable). Using these
estimates it seems that changing Mitterrand for Thatcher is equivalent (in terms of
benefits and other things equal) to increasing the unemployment rate by 2.9 percentage
points.
10 To get a better feel for the relative size of these effects, note that in terms of one
standard deviation, the politics effect is equal to 26 percent of the unemployment effect.
Regression (3) presents a more general specification using current and lagged values with
largely similar results.
   Although our model does not lead us to believe that fiscal or income variables would
have an independent impact on benefits, we check if our results are robust to the
inclusion of such control variables. We include government debt over GDP and
government deficit over GDP (from the IMF's International Financial Statistics) to
control for the government's fiscal position. The main results are unchanged. For
example, in a specification similar to regression (2), which also includes the debt and
deficit variables, we find very similar results in terms of size, sign and significance. If we
also include a country's GDP per capita (to see if there are "wealth" effects), the
coefficient on Unemployment (-1) keeps it sign but falls (in absolute value) by almost 24
percent, and is significant at the 6 percent level.
   Another potential objection to regressions (1-3) is that the unemployment effects may
simply be capturing reverse causality. A large literature in economics has found positive
effects of benefits in unemployment regressions, so a simultaneity bias may be present in
the unemployment coefficient. The first thing to note is that the coefficient on
Unemployment in regression (1-3) is actually negative, and the presumed simultaneity
                                                       
     
10 The election of Mitterrand may itself have been the endogenous response of voters for the
party with more generous welfare policy in bad times. Such dynamics are beyond the scope of
this paper.12
bias is positive. Hence, if there were a bias at all, it would only mean that the true
coefficient on Unemployment is larger in absolute value (i.e. more negative). Secondly,
we run regressions of the form Y=f[Unemployment(-1), Unemployment(-2), Benefits(-1),
Benefits(-2)], for both Y=Unemployment and Y=Benefits for 19 OECD countries during
1971-89. When Y=Unemployment, at least one coefficient on lagged benefits was
significant in 12 of the 19 cases, although in 3 of them the coefficient was negative.
When Y=Benefits, at least one of the coefficients on Unemployment was significant in 10
of the 19 cases, of which four indicated positive changes in unemployment increased the
level of Benefits, four suggested higher levels of Unemployment reduced Benefits and one
had a positive coefficient. These results suggest that, in terms of Granger causality, it is
just as likely that causality runs from unemployment to benefits, as it is that causality
runs the opposite way. Third, we look at the effect of the oil crisis by comparing the
change in benefits during the four years between 1971-75 and 1977-81. In both cases, the
increase in unemployment benefits was larger in the countries that were more dependent
on oil, measured by the price of oil (adjusted by exchange rates and weighted by the
country’s net oil imports divided by GDP).
11
   Another approach is to instrument the unemployment rate. The instrument used in
regression (4) in Table I is the level of openness in the economy (defined as exports plus
imports over GDP) and its lag. The coefficient on Unemployment is negative, significant
and larger in absolute value than the OLS estimate. This is to be expected, as the
presumed simultaneity bias is positive. The coefficients on Interest Rate and Right Wing
are similar to the OLS estimates. We experimented with other variables as instruments,
such as the import weighted country specific price of oil, an index of military
expenditures (suggested by Phelps [1994]) and the proportion of home ownership (as in
Oswald [1997]), with very similar results.
12 The instruments pass standard tests for
                                                       
     
11 Section V below presents a historical case study and a section on direct legislative evidence
that can be interpreted as providing further evidence on this issue.
     
12 The first stage regressions show that openness is positively related with unemployment.
Interestingly, Rodrik [1998] shows that openness increases welfare spending (i.e. benefits times
unemployment). He argues that more open economies are more risky so that benefits are higher.13
instrument validity, although the low power of such tests is a source of concern. A similar
picture emerges from focusing on the lagged values in regression (5). This specification
uses the lag of openness as an instrument for Unemployment (-1). Regression (6) uses the
level of home ownership, the lag of openness and the level and lag of the import-
weighted price of oil and the index of military spending as instruments.
   A third potential objection to regressions (1-3) is that the benefit data mix up data on
unemployment insurance programs with traditional income support programs (welfare).
In some countries, the U.S. and Canada are two examples, people using unemployment
insurance programs are a very different group of individuals than people on welfare, so
that very different political dynamics may drive movements in these components of the
benefit measure. In order to investigate this issue we obtained the raw data used to
construct the benefit index from the OECD and calculated two different measures of
benefits.
13 The first one, called Benefits Short, is a summary measure of the benefits
received by a typical person during his/her first year unemployed. The second is a
summary measure of the benefits received by a typical person after his/her third year
unemployed. Table II repeats the same basic specifications as those in Table I, but using
Benefits Short as the dependent variable. The estimated effects are larger than those
presented in Table I. Regression (7), for example, shows that a one standard deviation
increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a reduction of 6.7 percentage points
in the Benefits Short variable, or almost 32 percent of a standard deviation in this
variable. Regression (8) estimates that a one standard deviation increase in the
unemployment rate leads to a cut of 8.5 percentage points in the Benefits Short variable,
or 40 percent of a standard deviation in this variable. Regression (9) presents the general
specification with similar results. Regressions (10-12) in Table II show that, using the
                                                                                                                                                                    
However the alternative hypothesis (spending increases because there are more claimants at an
unchanged level of benefits) should not be discarded, particularly since we show that the
parameters of the unemployment benefit system are negatively correlated with the level of
unemployment.
     
13 We thank Pascal Marianna and David Grubb at the OECD for providing us with the raw
benefit data and generous explanations regarding their construction.14
exact same set of instruments, the 2SLS estimates are much closer to the OLS estimates
when the dependent variable is Benefits Short than when it is Benefits. The coefficient on
Unemployment (-1) in regression (12) is only significant at the 9 percent level. If the
import weighted price of oil, together with the levels and lags of the index of military
spending and openness, are used as instruments the coefficient is significant at the 5
percent level (although the coefficient is larger in absolute size).
   Table III examines the determinants of long-term benefits, Benefits Long. The results
are much weaker. Most of the economic dynamics that appear to be driving short-term
benefits are absent here. There is some evidence that political pressures affect third year
benefits. Regression (14) shows that a change in government equivalent to substituting
Francois Mitterrand by Margaret Thatcher is expected to bring about a reduction in
unemployment benefits of 3.1 percentage points, or 26 percent of a standard deviation in
the Benefits Long variable. The 2SLS estimates show that the same set of instruments has
a much weaker effect on Benefits Long, compared with Table II.
   Movements in interest rates (even at two-year frequencies) could be influenced by
transitory movements in monetary and fiscal policy, and such changes may not influence
people’s decision to fund the welfare state. We repeated all the regressions presented
excluding the interest rate. All the main results continue to hold. The main exception is
regression (1) in Table I where the coefficient on Unemployment is only significant at the
7-percent level. Regression (19) in Table IV illustrates with the simple lagged
specification.
   A related question deals with the nature of unemployment. Economists have observed
that an unemployment rate driven by a large number of people who spend little time
unemployed could involve lower social costs than a similar rate of unemployment made
up by few people who spend a long time unemployed. Accordingly, it may be argued that
long-term unemployment may bolster political demands for unemployment benefits more
than short-term unemployment. Data of this kind are only available for some of the
countries in our sample, and often for a limited number of years. Thus, the evidence we
provide is only suggestive and a proper test of how robust our main findings are to these15
considerations must be left to future research. Table IV shows how benefits are related to
the two measures of unemployment. It is suggestive that higher rates of long-term
unemployment (the number of individuals who have been unemployed longer than 6
months divided by the labor force) tend to be associated with higher benefits while the
opposite is true for the short-term unemployment rate. For example, we can reject the
hypothesis that the coefficient on long-term unemployment is equal to that on the short-
term unemployment rate in regression (20) at the 8 percent level. Regressions (21-22) in
Table IV look for differential effects of short and long term unemployment on Benefits
Short and Benefits Long using the lagged specification (which is the one yielding more
precise estimates). The evidence, if anything, favours the hypothesis that short-term
unemployment reduces the demand for unemployment insurance (Benefits Short) while
long-term unemployment bolsters demands for more generous long-duration benefits.
   Lastly, it could also be argued that we should include a lagged dependent variable.
Although our theory does not lead us to expect that the long run response of benefits to
exogenous variables to differ in the short and long run, it is important at this stage of our
theoretical knowledge to keep our empirical strategy open. We repeat regressions (2) and
(3), but including a lagged dependent variable. The maximum number of periods
available equals 10, so a bias on the lagged dependent variable may be present. To
correct for this, the System Generalised Method of Moments (SGMM) technique
developed by Arellano and Bond [1991] for dynamic panel data is used to estimate
regressions (23-24).
14 Although this estimator controls for the bias in the lagged
dependent variable and for the omitted variable bias that occurs in OLS estimation, we
still have to deal with the potential endogeneity of Unemployment and Unemployment (-
1). Hence, we use openness, military spending and home ownership as instruments. In
regression (23), the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is large and significant
                                                       
     
14 The estimator works by combining moment conditions for equations in first differences with
moment conditions for equations in levels. By exploiting the information contained in the levels
and the first differenced equations at each point in time, the estimator is the most efficient
available to correct for the bias arising in panels with lagged dependent variables that control for
fixed effects (for more details see Arellano and Bond [1991]).16
while that on Unemployment (-1) is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. Right
Wing (-1) also has a negative coefficient that is now significant at conventional levels. Its
size implies that an increase in the right wing inclinations of the government equal to 3.5
standard deviations (equivalent to replacing Mitterrand by Margaret Thatcher) reduces
the benefit replacement rate by 1.6 percentage points in the short run. The long run effect
is to cut benefits by 22 percentage points (or 1.7 standard deviations of the benefit
variable). The coefficient on the rate of interest is insignificant. Regression (24) repeats
the exercise including current values.
V.  Further Evidence on the Determinants of Unemployment Benefits
   Our model suggests that the level of unemployment risk in the economy is an important
determinant of unemployment benefits. Individuals, even if currently employed, may
vote to have higher unemployment benefits when the environment is more risky. We do
not have adequate data (for example on inflows) so a proper test of this hypothesis is not
feasible. In this section we propose three different pieces of evidence that can be
interpreted as shedding some light on this issue.
V.A. Regression Evidence
   The regressions where both levels and lags of the unemployment rate are presented in
the previous section could be re-interpreted to include a change in unemployment term.
For example, regression (3) in Table I could be interpreted as including a
contemporaneous term and a term denoting the change in the unemployment rate
(because A Unemploymentt + B Unemploymentt-1 = (A+B) Unemploymentt - B
DUnemploymentt). If we do so, the coefficient on the current unemployment rate is –0.8
(significant at the 1 percent level) while the coefficient on the change in the
unemployment rate is 0.9 (significant at the 2 percent level). This is important because
the change in the unemployment rate could be interpreted as the inflow rate from
employment into the unemployment pool, a variable that our model predicts should17
influence benefit determination.
15 If this interpretation is adopted then the evidence is
consistent with higher insurance demands when workers feel more threatened by
unemployment, as described in our model (see Appendix I). The effects are economically
significant. A one standard deviation increase in DUnemployment increases the level of
benefits by 1.2-percentage points, or 9 percent of a standard deviation in the benefits
variable. From a policy perspective, these results suggest that governments may not want
to reduce unemployment benefits (and taxes) when unemployment is rising, even when
the unemployment rate is high.
   We can also re-interpret the results in regression (9) in Table II where the dependent
variable is Benefits Short, as involving a change in the unemployment rate. The first two
terms can be re-written as -2.6 Unemployment + 2.1 DUnemployment, both comfortably
significant (t-statistics of -5.4 and 2.9 respectively). A one standard deviation increase in
DUnemployment increases the level of benefits by 2.7 percentage points, or 13 percent of
a standard deviation in the Benefits Short variable. A one standard deviation increase in
the unemployment rate is associated with a reduction in Benefits Short of 9 percentage
points, or 42 percent of a standard deviation in this variable. The coefficients on
regression (24) in Table IV (SGMM) can also be interpreted as showing a negative and
significant effect of the level of unemployment on benefits and a positive effect
(significant at the 6 percent level) of the change in unemployment.
V. B.  Direct Evidence
   This section provides direct evidence consistent with the interpretation that when
unemployment increases temporarily as part of the current business cycle there may be a
different benefit response compared to the longer run effect on benefits of more long
lasting structural unemployment. The direct evidence comes from the effect of the
                                                       
     
15 It can be argued, however, that the change in the unemployment rate increases because the
duration of unemployment gets longer, not because inflows increase. Note, however, that if
average duration increases our model suggests that workers may demand more insurance because
of the higher cost of risk (falling unemployed is more costly) even if the risk is not higher
(probability of falling unemployed remains constant). The use of DUnemployment means that we
cannot distinguish between the effect of duration and the effect of inflows.18
economic environment on benefit generosity (mainly concerning duration) as stated in
the laws defining benefit provision in several countries.
   In the US the Federal/State Extended Compensation Act of 1970 established a second
layer of benefits for claimants who exhaust their regular entitlement during periods of
relatively high unemployment in a state. This program provided for up to 13 extra weeks
of benefits at the claimant's usual weekly benefit amount. The benefits are triggered on if
the state's insured unemployment rate for the past 13-week period is 20 percent higher
than the rate for the corresponding period in the past two years and the rate is at least 5
percent. Extended benefits cease to become available when the insured unemployment
rate does not meet either the 20 percent requirement or the 5 percent requirement. In 1973
the 13-week rule applied, but in 1975 as labour market conditions worsened in the face of
the first oil shock, Federal law made unemployment insurance payable "for additional 26
weeks in cases of high unemployment". This ruled until 1983 when Federal law reduced
the extension back to 13 weeks.
   In Canada in 1975 unemployment benefits were "payable after a 2-week waiting period
for 18 weeks extended up to 51 weeks, depending on [national and regional
unemployment rates]". Although prior to 1977, benefits depended both on the national
and regional unemployment rate, after 1977 new legislation made extensions to benefit
duration dependent solely on regional unemployment rates. In 1979 unemployment
benefits were payable for "up to 25 weeks, extended up to 50 weeks, depending on
regional unemployment rates". There have been a number of subsequent changes to the
Canadian unemployment insurance system, three of which have involved changing the
relationship between benefits and regional unemployment rates. In 1990 benefit durations
varied between 17 and 50 weeks, in 1994 this was changed to between 14 and 50 weeks,
and in 1996 it was changed again to vary between 14 and 45 weeks (all depending on the
number of weeks the claimant has worked and the unemployment rate in their region).
16
                                                       
     
16 The evidence comes from Social Security Programs Throughout the World, a U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services publication, Highlights of State Unemployment
Compensation Laws, a U.S. National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers'
Compensation publication, and from the Department of Human Resources Development of the
Canadian Government.19
   Hence both in the US and Canada, adverse shocks which change the unemployment
rate also change benefit generosity. Other countries have also produced similar
legislation. In South Africa, for example, there exists administrative discretion to increase
the generosity of benefits (both in terms of duration and amount) in cases of prolonged
unemployment. In Japan there are additional allowances for workers in depressed
industries. Another example where a related process is visible includes countries which
have recently made pro-market reforms and have seen benefit demands vary with the
consequent rise in unemployment. For example, in Argentina the increase in
unemployment has "provoked calls from the unions and the church to direct more
spending towards public works and increase the coverage and duration of unemployment
benefits" (The Financial Times, July 21, 1995).
V. C.   Historical Evidence
   Further evidence on the effect of short run increases in unemployment (in contrast to
long run movements in structural unemployment) on the level of benefits can be found
from historical evidence. This kind of evidence has an additional advantage. Estimating
the effect of unemployment on benefits can be difficult, as reverse causality is potentially
present. Since most tests for instrument validity have low power, it is important to keep
our empirical strategy open to less formal evidence that can help us identify the effects of
interest. We believe that standard historical accounts of the birth of the American welfare
state provide such evidence.  It seems that legislative efforts to introduce unemployment
insurance laws were more intense in times of increasing unemployment.  This has the
important virtue that, by restricting attention to a period in time when there were no
unemployment benefits, we rule out causality going from benefits to unemployment.
   Figure 1 shows how the unemployment rate varied from 1900 to 1942 in the US, along
with key dates in the legislative agenda as described in Moss [1996]. In 1915 as
unemployment rose up to 7.18 percent, UI was first proposed by the American
Association of Labour Legislation (AALL) and a UI bill was introduced to the
Massachusetts House of Representatives on January 14, 1916 (label "1"). In the 192120
recession, as unemployment spiked upward to 8.73 percent, the AALL made a second UI
proposal and Senator Huber introduced a UI bill to the Wisconsin Legislature (label "2").
The next significant date is 1931, when the unemployment rate was 15.7 per cent, having
been rising up from a level of 5 percent in 1929. Wisconsin was the first US state to pass
unemployment benefit legislation in 1931 (label "3"). In the following two years as
unemployment reached levels of over 20 per cent, a UI scheme was considered
throughout the US, culminating with President Roosevelt launching the legislative
process for social security in 1934 (label "4"), and the passing of the 1935 Social Security
Act (label "5").
   Hence there seems to be a relationship between variations in the unemployment rate,
and UI legislative activity in a period when changes in unemployment could not have
been due to changes in the generosity of the (non-existent) benefit system. Blaustein
[1993] observes that "interest in unemployment insurance legislation during the 1920’s ,
however, was weak. It was a period largely of prosperity and normalcy", but in contrast
there was "increased legislative activity …with the onset of the depression of the 1930s
and its mounting unemployment". Moss [1996] notes that during this time the AALL's
"legislative agenda was thus loosely tied to the business cycle" and "critics charged that
Andrews and his colleagues (at the AALL) were exploiting the misfortune of others to
keep themselves in business". See Figure 1.
VI. Conclusion
   Countries differ in the generosity of their unemployment insurance programs. Within
each country, unemployment insurance programs change over time. This paper provides
a first attempt at evaluating how much of these variations can be explained by economic
and political factors. That is, we attempt to study the determinants of unemployment
benefits.
   To our knowledge only two theory papers, Wright [1986] and Atkinson [1990], have
looked before at the positive aspects of the determination of unemployment benefits.
Neither, however, allows for a positive impact of unemployment benefits on the21
unemployment rate, an important feature of the model presented here. Benefits are set
maximising the wishes of the employed, the unemployed and firms subject to budget
constraint and a non-negative trade-off between benefits and unemployment.
Comparative static results depend on the size of the "incentive effects".
   Using OECD data for 1971-1989 and controlling for both country and time fixed
effects, the paper finds evidence that benefits fall when the unemployment rate is high.
This is consistent with the tax effect identified in Wright’s and Atkinson’s models, as
well as the model presented here. There is no evidence, however, of the existence of a
negative relationship between the interest rate and benefits (as predicted in Wright
[1986]). There is weaker evidence suggesting that benefits decrease with right-wing
preferences of the government (consistent with the analysis of Boadway and Oswald
[1982]). In fact, the importance of economic variables relative to political variables is,
perhaps, one of the more surprising aspects of the analysis we present.
   We construct a measure of the parameters of the unemployment benefit system paid out
in the first year of unemployment. We then compare this with a measure of long term
benefits. It seems that our results are substantially stronger when the short-term benefits
measure is used, suggesting that different political dynamics drive movements in
unemployment insurance as compared to welfare payments. We allow for a simultaneity
bias on the unemployment coefficient and find some evidence of exogenous effects of
unemployment on the parameters of the benefit system. Since the presumed effect of
unemployment on benefits has a non-negative sign, accounting for this bias reinforces the
result that a higher level of unemployment leads to a lower level of benefits.
   Our model suggests that individuals will demand higher benefits when the economic
environment is more risky. A shortcoming of our analysis is the lack of suitable data to
test this hypothesis. Our regression results can be read as providing evidence that benefits
increase with positive changes in the unemployment rate, a variable that provides one
measure of the employment risk in the environment. Direct evidence from the laws that
define benefits and historical evidence on the birth of the American Welfare State are
also consistent with this view.22
Appendix I
   To put more structure into the problem assume there are a fixed number of identical,
risk averse workers who derive instantaneous utility U(.). Assume that Uw>0, Uww<0,
Ue<0, where w is the wage and e is effort (subscripts denote partial derivatives). The
asset equation for an employed worker is
) ( ) (
E U E V V t e s w U V r - + - - = (A1)
The asset equation for an unemployed worker is
) ( ) (
U E U V V j s b U V r - + - = (A2)
where the discount rate is r, the inflow rate of employed workers into unemployment is t,
and j is the job acquisition rate. Solving (A1) and (A2) simultaneously yields expressions
for V
E and V
U. The first order condition (FOC) is
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Case I: No Unemployment/Benefit Trade-off
In order to show the negative discount rate effect of Wright [1986] and the negative
unemployment level effect of Atkinson [1990] in the simplest possible setting, assume
the government is captured by the employed so y=0 and f=1, so we do not have full
insurance.
17 As in these models assume mb(b,W)=0, so higher benefits do not affect
unemployment and worker effort initially plays no role in our model. Assume accessions
equal separations. Compute db/du to find that the effect is ambiguous. A higher tax
burden to the employed brings about lower benefits as in Atkinson [1990], but the higher
cost of falling unemployed in the bigger pool of unemployed requires higher benefits
(depending on the degree of risk aversion). The first effect dominates when the utility
function exhibits CARA (constant absolute risk aversion). To see the effect of the
discount rate use the FOC (A3) to compute ¶b/¶r < 0, and use this to find db/dr < 0,
assuming CARA. To see that the effect of inflows is ambiguous compute db/dt. The
direct effect of higher inflows is to bring about higher benefits since the employed want
more insurance. The indirect effect of a higher level of inflows (through unemployment)
is to decrease the level of benefits with CARA.
Case II: Positive Unemployment/Benefit Trade-off
   When mb(b,W)>0, higher benefits induce higher unemployment. Assume the trade-off is
derived from the Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] model in which firms are able to imperfectly
monitor a worker's effort so that workers must choose between supplying the required
level of effort and shirking, in which case there is a probability, q, that the worker will be
caught and fired. Due to the monitoring problem, worker effort, e, will be a function of
                                                       
     
17 We concentrate on the case where the government is the sole provider of benefits.
Explaining why private firms do not provide unemployment insurance is beyond the scope of this
paper.23
the excess of wages over the opportunity cost of work, which depends on unemployment
benefits and the unemployment rate. Consequently, firms find it individually profitable to
pay higher than market clearing wages to deter shirking. Under these assumptions a "no-
shirking-condition" can be derived which describes an inverse relationship between the
unemployment rate and the level of wages. For simplicity, assume y=0 and f=1.
Proposition 1: If workers have CARA utility, U(y)=-exp(-s(y-e)) (where y is income and
s is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion) and aggregate labour demand is of the form:
l(u)=a+b(1-u)
-e (where b>0), then the equilibrium level of benefits is (i) increasing with
adverse exogenous shocks which increase the level of unemployment; (ii) decreasing
with the inflow rate if 0<e<p (for p defined below); and (iii) increasing with the discount
rate.
Proof: The FOC  for problem (1) can be expressed as
1 )] 1 ( [ ) 1 (
- - +
+ - - =
s s s u
At
Ar q
u b s eb
e (A4)
where A=1-exp(-se).
18 The unemployment rate can be determined as a function of the set
of exogenous parameters, W, by substituting in (A4) for the labour market equilibrium





(i) An exogenous adverse shock that increases the level of unemployment, such as a
shock to labour demand arising from a drop in the value of the parameter, a, increases
both terms on the right hand side of (A4). The level of benefits is therefore higher.
(ii) A higher inflow rate causes the unemployment rate to increase: u
S
t>0. Use (A4) to
define benefits as a function of t. Then the sign of b
S
t equals the sign of e-p. This is
negative for 0<e<p, where p=(1+rA/q)/exp(s(l(u
S)-b
S-e))<1. Hence the level of benefits
is less for a higher level of inflow rate.
(iii) A higher discount rate implies a higher level of unemployment: u
S
r>0. From (A4) the
level of benefits, b
S, will also be higher.
                                                       
     
18 A sufficient condition for the second order condition to be satisfied is 0<e<1.24
Appendix II
Sample of 16 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, The United
Kingdom and The United States.
Definition of the Variables:
Benefits: The OECD index of (pre-tax) unemployment insurance benefit entitlements
divided by the corresponding wage (calculated for odd-numbered years). This summary
measure estimates the situation of a representative individual. It calculates the
unweighted mean of 18 numbers based on all combinations of the following scenarios: (i)
three unemployment durations (for persons with a long record of previous employment);
the first year, the second and third years, and the fourth and fifth years of unemployment.
(ii) three family and income situations: a single person, a married person with a
dependent spouse, and a married person with a spouse in work. (iii) two different levels
of previous earnings: average earnings and two-thirds of average earnings. See the OECD
Jobs Study [1994].
Benefits Short: The OECD index of (pre-tax) unemployment insurance benefit
entitlements divided by the wage calculated as the un-weighted mean of 6 numbers based
on all combinations of the following scenarios: (i) unemployment duration of less than
one year. (ii) three family and income situations: a single person, a married person with a
dependent spouse, and a married person with a spouse in work. (iii) two different levels
of previous earnings: average earnings and two-thirds of average earnings. See the OECD
Jobs Study [1994].
Benefits Long: The OECD index of (pre-tax) unemployment insurance benefit
entitlements divided by the wage calculated as the unweighted mean of 6 numbers based
on all combinations of the following scenarios: (i) unemployment durations of between
three and four years. (ii) three family and income situations: a single person, a married
person with a dependent spouse, and a married person with a spouse in work. (iii) two
different levels of previous earnings: average earnings and two-thirds of average
earnings. See the OECD Jobs Study [1994].
Right Wing: Index of left/right political party strength, defined as the sum of the number
of votes received by each party participating in cabinet expressed as a percentage of total
votes received by all parties with cabinet representation, multiplied by a left/right
political scale constructed by political scientists. Votes are from Mackie and Rose, The
International Almanac of Electoral History, cabinet composition is from The Europa
Yearbook (1969-1989 editions), and the left/right scale is from Castles and Mair [1984].
The scale ranges from 1 to 10.
Interest Rate: The long run real interest rate, from OECD Historical Statistics.
Unemployment: The unemployment rate from the OECD CEP data set.
DUnemployment: The change in unemployment (=Unemploymentt-Unemploymentt-1).
Unemployment < 6 months: The proportion of the labour force who have been
unemployed for durations of less than 6 months.
Unemployment > 6 months: The proportion of the labour force who have been
unemployed for durations of more than 6 months.25
TABLE A.0. Principal Features of Nations’ Unemployment Benefit Systems
1. Australia: Unemployment Assistance (unlimited duration) and Social Assistance.
2. Austria: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to one year),   
Unemployment Assistance (unlimited duration) and Social Assistance.
3. Belgium: Unemployment Insurance (unlimited duration) and Social Assistance.
4. Canada: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 1 year where
benefit durations are extended in regions with high unemployment) and Social
Assistance.
5. Denmark: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 5 years)
and Social Assistance.
6. Finland: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 23 months),
Unemployment Assistance (unlimited duration) and Social Assistance.
7. France: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 5 years),
Unemployment Assistance (unlimited duration) and Social Assistance.
8. Germany: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 1 year),
Unemployment Assistance (unlimited duration) and Social Assistance.
9. Ireland: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 15 months),
Unemployment Assistance (indefinite duration) and Social Assistance.
10. Italy: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 6 months).
11. Netherlands: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 60
months), Unemployment Assistance (limited 12 month duration) and Social
Assistance.
12. Norway: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 18 months),
and Social Assistance.
13. New Zealand: Unemployment Assistance (unlimited duration) and Social Assistance.
14. Sweden: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 10 months),
Unemployment Assistance (limited 5 month duration) and Social Assistance.
15. United Kingdom: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 1
year), Unemployment Assistance (unlimited duration) and Social Assistance.
16. United States: Unemployment Insurance (for unemployment durations of up to 6
months where benefit durations are extended in States with high unemployment)
and Social Assistance.
Notes: (1) All information is based on the benefit system in effect as of 1 July 1995. (2) Unemployment
Assistance refers to means-tested benefits that may be conditional on previous employment history. (3)
Social Assistance refers to means-tested income support whereby the government acts to secure a minimum
standard of living. Social Assistance is included in the OECD Summary Measure of Benefit Entitlements
only when it consists of a general income guarantee at nationally determined level, such as in Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. (4) Data sources are The OECD Jobs
Study (1994), OECD Benefit Systems and Work Incentives (1998 Edition) and Social Security Programs
throughout the World (1995).26
TABLE A.I. Description of Data: Most and Least Generous Benefits (1971-89 Averages)
Countries Netherlands Denmark Belgium Switzerland Japan Italy
Benefits 0.496 0.467 0.448 0.116 0.101 0.012
TABLE A.II. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Benefits 160 0.272 0.129 0.004 0.562
Benefits Short 160 0.426 0.211 0.01 0.888
Benefits Long 160 0.167 0.120 0 0.432
Unemployment 160 0.055 0.034 0.002  0.169
DUnemployment 160 0.004 0.013 -0.029  0.045
Right Wing 160 5.197 1.565 2.275  7.800
Interest Rate 160 0.022 0.035 -0.077  0.104
Unemployment < 6 months 71 0.035 0.018 0.011 0.086
Unemployment > 6 months 71 0.034 0.033 0.001 0.137
Note: Right Wing has been scaled down by a factor of 1000 in the results reported in Tables I to IV.27
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Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 160 158 158 160 158 158
R
2 (Adjusted) 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.84
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, 
** denotes significance
at the 5 per cent level, LSDV denotes Least Squares Dummy Variables, IV denotes Instrumental Variables.
Openness and its lag are used as instruments in regression (4). Lagged Openness is used as an instrument in
regression (5). Regression (6) uses the level of home ownership, the lag of openness and the level and lag
of oil and military spending as instruments.28
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Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 160 158 158 160 158 158
R
2 (Adjusted) 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.85
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, 
** denotes significance
at the 5 per cent level. Short-Term Unemployment Benefits are defined as having duration of less than 1
year. LSDV denotes Least Squares Dummy Variables, IV denotes Instrumental Variables. Openness and its
lag are used as instruments in regression (10). Lagged Openness is used as an instrument in regression (11).
Regression (12) uses the level of home ownership, the lag of openness and the level and lag of oil and
military spending as instruments.29
TABLE III



































































Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 160 158 158 160 158 158
R
2 (Adjusted) 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.81
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, 
** denotes significance
at the 5 per cent level. Long-Term Unemployment Benefits are defined as having duration of greater than 3
years. LSDV denotes Least Squares Dummy Variables, IV denotes Instrumental Variables. Openness and
its lag are used as instruments in regression (16). Lagged Openness is used as an instrument in regression
(17). Regression (18) uses the level of home ownership, the lag of openness and the level and lag of oil and
military spending as instruments.30
Table IV:













































































Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of Observations 158 71 71 71 158 158
R
2 (Adjusted) 0.88 0.94 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.94
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, 
** denotes significance
at the 5 per cent level, LSDV denotes Least Squares Dummy Variables. Dependent Variables: regressions
(19,20, 23 and 24) = Benefits, regression (21) = Benefits Short, regression (22) = Benefits Long. Regression
(23) uses the lags of openness, home ownership and military spending as instruments, while regression (24)
uses the lags and levels of oil, military spending and the lags of openness and home ownership.31
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